

# *Protection Domains, Virtual Machines and Hypervisors*

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# Hardware Virtualization

- Virtual Machine: efficient, isolated duplicate of a physical machine
  - Execution environment essentially identical to the physical machine
  - Programs only see a small decrease in speed
  - A “monitor” or “hypervisor” is in full control of physical resources
- Programs running in a VM **should** not see differences respect to real hw
- Virtualization should be efficient
- Programs should not be able to access resources outside of the VM

# VMs and OSs

- How is an OS related to Virtual Machines?
  - The OS should provide support for the Virtual Machine Monitor / hypervisor
  - The OS *could* be optimized to run inside a VM
- OS support for virtualization (as host or as guest)
  - Impact on resource management
  - Impact on the exposed features
  - Impact on the I/O devices support
- Impact on the OS architecture?
  - Host: type-1 hypervisors,  $\mu$ -kernel systems
  - Guest: library OSs, unikernels, vertically structured OSs

# CPU Virtualization

- First idea: simulate the CPU hw in software
  - Software implementation of an abstract machine implementing the fetch-decode-execute-(write) cycle
  - **Fails** the **efficiency** requirement!!!
- Other idea: directly execute the virtualized instructions on the CPU
  - Virtual ISA: exact copy of the host ISA
  - Might fail the third (VMM is in control) requirement
  - Limited to unprivileged instructions (with VMM executing at a high privilege level)
  - What to do for privileged instructions?

# Virtualizable CPU Architectures

- The monitor should be able to “intercept” some machine instructions
  - Some kind of trap / exception / software interrupt must be generated
  - Not always possible (think about x86 ring 0)
- The CPU must provide some support for full virtualization
  - “More than supervisor” mode → hypervisor mode
  - Introduce two operating modes: “root mode” and “non-root mode”; non-root mode can only modify a shadow copy of the CPU privileged state
  - ...


# OSs for Virtualizable Architectures

- Virtualizable ISA: how to use it?
  - VMM or hypervisor responsible for managing VMs and other resources
  - Re-invent an OS, or using an existing one?
- OS support for hypervisors
  - Hosted hypervisor
  - Dom0
  - ...
- Difference between a hypervisor and a  $\mu$ -kernel???
  - Are we reinventing an old idea?
  - ...And, what are  $\mu$ -kernels, after all???

# ParaVirtualization

- So, CPU virtualization can be easy and efficient
  - Provided that the ISA is virtualizable
  - Provided host OS support / hypervisor
- What about I/O devices?
  - Virtualizing real hardware can be complex and inefficient
  - Idea: device passthrough
  - Other possibility: paravirtualization
- Paravirtualization: the guest knows that it is running in a VM
  - Memory buffers can be (securely) shared between guest and host
  - ...

# Example of (Toy) CPU




- Toy CPU: just an example with many simplifications
- Modern (real) CPUs are much more complex!
  - Pipeline
  - Parallel execution



# CPUs, Programs, & Friends

- CPU → executes programs
  - Stored in main memory
  - Use data from main memory
- Program: formal description of an algorithm
  - Using a programming language
- Sequence of machine instructions
  - **Actions** having **effects** on some “**passive entities**”
  - “Passive entity”: data structure stored in main memory
- Instance of program in execution: sequence of actions on data

# Executing a Program



- CPU: cyclical execution (fetch / decode / load / execute / save)
  - Machine instructions are executed (mainly) sequentially
- Machine designed to execute its own language!
  - Machine Language

# Physical Machines...

- Computer: (physical) machine designed to execute programs
- Every machine executes programs written in **its own language**
- Relationship between **machine** and **language**
  - A machine has its own language (the language it can parse and execute)
  - A language can be “understood” (parsed and executed) by multiple different machines
- Program execution: (infinite) cycle  
fetch/decode/load/execute/save
  - CPU: hw implementation of this cycle

# ...And Abstract Machines!

- The fetch/decode/load/execute/save cycle can be implemented in hw or in sw...
- Software Implementation: **Abstract Machine**
  - Algorithms and data structures used to **store** and **execute** programs
- Once upon a time referred as “*Virtual Machine*”
  - Today, the term “Virtual Machine” (VM) is used with a slightly different meaning


# Abstract Machines and Languages

- Similarly to physical machines (CPUs), each abstract machine has its own machine language
  - Machine language for a CPU: sequence of 0 / 1
    - Assembly makes it more readable
  - Abstract machines generally have higher level machine languages (C, Java, etc...)
- $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{L}}$ : abstract machine understanding language  $\mathcal{L}$ 
  - $\mathcal{L}$  is the *machine language* of  $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{L}}$
  - Program: sequence of instructions written in  $\mathcal{L}$
- $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{L}}$  is just a possible way to describe  $\mathcal{L}$

# Abstract Machines Behaviour

- To execute a program written in  $\mathcal{L}$ ,  $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{L}}$  has to:
  1. Execute some “elementary operations”
    - In hw, ALU
  2. Manage the execution flow
    - Execution is not only sequential (jumps, loops, etc...)
    - In hw, PC handling
  3. Move data from / to memory
    - Addressing modes, ...
  4. Take care of memory management
    - Dynamic allocation, stack management, etc...

# Abstract Machine Example



- Execution cycle: very similar to a CPU...
- ... But it is implemented in software!

# Implementing a Language


- $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{L}}$  understands its machine language  $\mathcal{L}$ 
  - One single machine language per abstract machine
- $\mathcal{L}$  can be executed by multiple different abstract machines
  - Might differ in implementation, data structures, ...
- Implementation of language  $\mathcal{L}$ : abstract machine  $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{L}}$  that understands programs written in language  $\mathcal{L}$ 
  - Implementation in hw, sw, firmware, ...



# Software Implementation


- $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{L}}$  in software (can execute programs written in  $\mathcal{L}$ )
- Executes on a **Host Machine**  $\mathcal{M}h_{\mathcal{L}h}$  (having machine language  $\mathcal{L}h$ )
- Two possible implementations: *interpreter* or *compiler*
  - Interpreter: program written in  $\mathcal{L}h$  that understands and executes  $\mathcal{L}$ 
    - Implements the fetch/decode/load/exec/save cycle
  - Compiler: program translating other programs from  $\mathcal{L}$  to  $\mathcal{L}h$

# Pure Interpreters




- Interpreter: program written in  $\mathcal{L}_h$  (executes on  $M_{h_{\mathcal{L}_h}}$ ) understanding programs written in  $\mathcal{L}$
- Translates  $\mathcal{L}_h$  in  $\mathcal{L}$  “instruction by instruction”

# Pure Compilers



- Translates the whole program from  $\mathcal{L}$  to  $\mathcal{L}h$  *before executing it*
- Translation performed by a dedicated program, the **Compiler**
  - Compiler: not necessarily written in  $\mathcal{L}h$
  - Can execute on an abstract machine  $\mathcal{M}a$  different from  $\mathcal{M}h_{\mathcal{L}h}$

# Hybrid Implementation



- Not a pure compiler nor a pure interpreter
- Compiler translate in an *intermediate language*  $\mathcal{L}_i$
- Interpreter executes on  $\mathcal{M}_{h_{\mathcal{L}_h}}$  programs written in  $\mathcal{L}_i$ 
  - Java: compiler  $\rightarrow$  bytecode, then JVM
  - C: compiler **generally** produces code that needs OS and runtime to execute

# CPU Emulators

- CPU Emulator: software implementation of the fetch/decode/load/exec/save cycle
  - Can be an interpreter, some sort of compiler, or a hybrid implementation
  - Different complexity / performance / flexibility trade-offs depending on the implementation strategy
- Performance penalty respect to direct execution on the emulated CPU
- Allows to emulate target CPU architectures different from the host CPU architecture
  - $\mathcal{L}$  and  $\mathcal{L}_h$  can be different
  - No constraints on the emulated or host ISA

# Interpreting CPU Instructions

- Simplest CPU emulator: software cycle interpreting CPU instructions
  - Read CPU instructions one by one ← according to the syntax defined in ISA manuals
    - Machine language instructions can have fixed size (RISC) or variable size (x86, ...)
  - Decode and execute (eventually loading or saving data) modifying the emulator's state
- Can be easily implemented reading the CPU documentation
- Example: Bochs (<http://bochs.sf.net>)

# Compiling Blocks of CPU Instructions

- Compiler-based approach: just-in-time translation of CPU instructions from  $\mathcal{L}$  to  $\mathcal{L}h$ 
  - More complex than a CPU interpreter, but can provide better performance
  - Example: loop translated 1 time and then executed multiple times at near-native speed
- Additional issues with self-modifying code and similar...
- Example: qemu
  - Contains a “Tiny Code Generator” (TCG) → sort of simple compiler

# Qemu TCG

- Compile a “Translation Block” (TB) when needed, and then execute compiled instructions
- Different “frontends” for each supported target (language  $\mathcal{L}$ )
  - Convert machine instructions of  $\mathcal{L}$  into “TCG instructions”
- Different “backends” for each supported host architecture (host language  $\mathcal{L}h$ )
  - Convert TCG instructions into machine instructions of  $\mathcal{L}h$
- Issues: identify TBs, invalidate them when needed, etc...



# CPU Virtualization

- Instead of emulating a CPU implementing  $\mathcal{M}_{\mathcal{L}}$  in software, execute target instructions in the host
  - This implies  $\mathcal{L} == \mathcal{L}h!!!$
- How can the monitor be in control of physical resources?
  - If the guest has control of the virtual machine...
  - ...It risks to have full control of the physical machine too!!!
- Only some of the guest instructions can be directly executed on the host CPU
  - Which ones? User application (low privilege level) for sure...

# The Monitor / Hypervisor

- The Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) **must be in control of physical resources** (requirement 3)
  - It manages Virtual Machines like an OS kernel manages processes
  - Virtual Machine: contains user code (unprivileged instructions) and (guest) OS kernel
- OS Kernel: runs in supervisor mode → supervisor for user code (user processes)
- VMM: supervises both user code and OS kernels → supervisor of supervisors ⇒ **Hypervisor!!!**
  - How does it work?
  - Mechanisms to control the execution of OS kernel code (privileged instructions)?

# Direct Execution of Untrusted Guest Code

- Some instructions cannot be executed
  - Which ones? We need a formal definition...
  - When the guest tries to execute these instructions, the hypervisor / VMM must intercept them
- OS kernels have similar issues
  - When user code tries to execute a privileged instruction, an exception fires → the kernel handles it
  - Simple concept: user code cannot execute privileged instructions
- Can something similar be done for CPU virtualization?

# Guest Code at Low Privilege Level

- Idea: execute the guest with a low privilege level
  - Intel x86: ring 3
- Hypervisor / VMM at high privilege level
  - When the guest tries to execute privileged instructions, exception / trap!
  - The VMM can handle it
- Will this work?
  - Thinking about x86, we can immediately see some issues...
  - Example: some unprivileged instructions can read some parts of the “CPU state” (AKA machine status word) without generating exceptions

# More Formal Definitions: Popek and Goldberg

- Paper from 1974!!!
  - *Formal Requirements for Virtualizable Third Generation Architectures*
- Provides formal definitions for VMM (the term “hypervisor” is only used in the keywords)
- Uses the formal definitions to determine a set of requirements for easily and efficiently virtualize the CPU
  - If the requirements are satisfied, it is possible to execute guest code in the host intercepting the relevant instructions
- Distinction between sensitive instructions and privileged instructions

# Privileged and Sensitive Instructions

- Privileged instructions (we already know)
  - Can be executed when the CPU is at high privilege level
  - Generate an exception when the CPU is at low privilege level
- Sensitive instructions (these are the “problematic ones”)
  - Change the “CPU configuration” / CPU state
  - Reveal something about the CPU state
- Popek and Goldberg provide formal definitions (for a simplified system: only memory, no interrupts, no paging, ...)

# Sensitive Instructions

- These are the instructions relevant when virtualizing the CPU!!!
- **Control Sensitive Instructions**: change the CPU state
  - In Popek and Goldberg's model, privilege level or accessible memory - memory is the only considered resource
  - In real systems, interrupt table, paging table, ...
- **Behavior Sensitive Instructions**: effects depend on the CPU state
  - In Popek and Goldberg's model, privilege level or accessible memory
  - In real systems, things are more complex...

# Popek & Goldberg Requirements

A VMM can be easily and efficiently implemented if the set of sensitive instructions is a subset of the privileged instructions

- Intuition: all the “problematic” instructions cause an exception if executed with low privilege level
  - Hence a privileged VMM can intercept them by executing the guest as unprivileged!!!
- More formally, instructions executed in user mode either:
  - Generate a result that does not depend on the “CPU state” ...
  - ...Or generate an exception!



# Real CPUs vs Popek & Goldberg

- Do real CPUs satisfy Popek & Goldberg requirements?
  - Some of them do... Mainly by IBM
- Other CPUs did not initially comply with the virtualization requirements
  - Motorola 68000: unprivileged instruction able to read the whole status register
    - Fixed in 68010
  - ARM: some sensitive unprivileged instructions
  - Intel x86: plenty of sensitive unprivileged instructions
  - MIPS had issue too... Fixed in Release 5 (2012)

# Intel x86 vs Popek & Goldberg

- Original x86 architecture: plenty of sensitive unprivileged instructions
  - Mainly related to the accessibility of status flags and to the privilege levels bits in segment registers
- $S\{GDT, IDT, LDT, MSW\}$
- `PUSHF` and `POPF`
- `LAR, LSL, VERR, VERW`
- `PUSH`, and `POP` with segment registers
- ...

# Instructions Accessing Special Registers

- GDTR, LDTR and IDTR: registers pointing to *descriptor tables* (data structures controlling the CPU operation)
- SGDT, SLDT and SIDT allow to read the content of these registers
  - Sensitive instructions!
  - A guest OS can use them to know the host descriptor tables...
- Allowed in user mode (ring 3 - low privilege level) without raising exceptions!
- SMSW allows to read the machine status word (part of `cr0`)
  - Sensitive too... And still not privileged!

# PUSHF and POPF

- Flags register: contains sensitive information, such as the **interrupt flag**
- PUSHF: pushes the flags register on the stack
  - Can be used to know the state of the interrupt flag
  - Does not generate exceptions...
- POPF: pops the flags register from the stack
  - Could be used to set / reset the interrupt flag???
  - If executed from ring 3, the state of `if` is not changed, but no exception is generated!!!

# Instructions Accessing the Privilege Level

- `LAR`, `LSL`, `VERR` and `VERW` play with the privilege level of a segment (least significant 2 bits of the segment descriptor)
  - Allow to read the privilege level of a segment
  - Allow to check if a segment can be accessed from current privilege level
  - ...
- Again, no exception is generated
  - A guest OS can easily know the host segments
  - A guest OS kernel can know that it is not running in ring 0
  - ...

# PUSH / POP with Segment Registers

- PUSH and POP can be used with segment registers
- Segment register: contain a segment descriptor
  - Two rightmost bits: protection level for the segment
  - Can easily leak from host to guest!!!
- Similar issues with segment registers in other instructions
  - STR
  - MOVE
  - CALL FAR / INT FAR
  - ...

## Example: POPF

```
movl $0, %eax
pushl %eax
popf
```

- Tries to load “0” in the flags register
- The flags register contains the interrupt flag  $\Rightarrow$  clear the interrupt flag!
  - Clearly not possible at low privilege level (ring 3)
  - The interrupt flag (and other flags) is not affected by `POPF` at ring 3
- No exception is generated  $\Rightarrow$  the VMM cannot know that the guest is trying to clear `if`

# A Dirty Workaround

- Does this mean that VMM / hypervisors could not be implemented on x86?
  - VMWare proved the opposite...
- Notice: Popek and Goldberg say that a VMM cannot be *easily and efficiently* implemented
  - If we accept complications and performance loss, we can work around the issue...
- Idea: replace all the sensitive unprivileged instructions with something that generate an interrupt / exception!!!
  - VMWare & friends used variations of this idea...
  - Possibly patented?



# The ARM Architecture

- ARM: RISC CPU (32-bit instructions, 16 registers, ...) with pragmatic design
  - Currently one of the major players in embedded systems
- Many different versions of the ARM core
  - Let's consider ARM v7
- Multiple privilege levels: user (USR), system (SYS), supervisor (SVC), interrupt (IRQ), fast interrupt (FIQ), abort (ABT) and undefined (UND)

# ARM vs Popek & Goldberg

- Original ARM: some sensitive unprivileged instructions
  - As for x86, mainly related to accessibility of the CPU state (status flags and other)
- CPU state:
  - Currently Active Processor Status Register (CPSR), saved in SPSR when switching from user mode to a privileged mode
  - Some *coprocessors* (example: CP15 - system coprocessor - controlling caches and similar)
  - ...

# Example: Accessing the PSR

- CPS modifies the CPSR
  - Similar to x86 flags register: can disable interrupts, etc...
  - Obviously, can be done from a privileged mode only!
- If executed with low privilege level (user mode), does nothing!
  - Does not trap!!!
- So it is **control sensitive** (can disable interrupts), **behaviour sensitive** (its behaviour depends on the privilege level) and **unprivileged!**

# ARM Sensitive Unprivileged Instructions

- ARM handling of the PSR → very similar to x86 handling of flags register
  - Unprivileged instructions can read it
    - Access to interrupt flag and other sensible information (behaviour sensitive)
    - Access to the privilege level (that is part of PSR) ← similar to x86 issues with segment registers
  - Unprivileged instructions can try to write it without generating exceptions!
- Looks like ARM “inherited” from x86 some of the issues that make it non-compliant with Popek & Goldberg requirements

# Virtual Memory

- Popek and Goldberg considered a very simple model of virtual memory
  - Segmented architecture with only one segment
  - If  $VA > \text{limit}$ , memory fault (exception)
  - Otherwise,  $PA = VA + \text{base}$
- Paging can also be supported, if P&G requirements are met and the VMM can intercept page faults
  - The VMM knows when the guest accesses the page table register
  - The VMM knows when the guest causes a page fault
  - The VMM can know when the guest accesses the page table

# Virtualized Paging

- The guest page table **is not** the “real” (host) page table
  - The VMM can intercept accesses to the page table register...
- The guest can freely modify its “virtualized page table”
  - Without even knowing that it is not the real page table!
- When the guest tries to use some of the mappings it created, a host page fault is generated!
  - The VMM can handle it adding a proper mapping in the host page table

# Example - 1

1. The guest sets the page table register (example:  $cr3$ ) to some value
  - Exception  $\rightarrow$  the VMM intercepts the write
  - Now the VMM knows where the guest page table is
  - If the guest tries to read the page table register, the read is intercepted by the VMM, that returns this value
  - The host page table is not affected
2. The guest modifies its page table mapping address  $VA_1$  into  $PA_1$ 
  - Nothing happens in the VMM / host

## Example - 2

3. The guest accesses  $VA_1$ 
  - $VA_1$  is not mapped in the “real” page table  $\Rightarrow$  page fault!
4. The VMM handles the page fault
  - Look at the guest page table
  - Find mapping for  $VA_1$
  - Create appropriate mapping in the host page table
5. The guest access to  $VA_1$  completes without issues
  - Technique sometimes known as “shadow paging”



# Shadow Paging - 1

- A “shadow page table” is used for converting guest VA into host PA
  - The guest page table is not really used by the MMU!!!
  - Used only by the VMM to update the shadow page table
- The VMM handles page faults
  - If a VA is not mapped in the guest page table, page fault forwarded to the guest
  - Otherwise, used to update the shadow page table
- A guest memory access can result in 2 page faults!!!

# Shadow Paging - 2

- The VMM can detect accesses to the guest page table, and update the shadow page table immediately
  - Avoid “lazy behaviour”
  - Can avoid the double page fault...
  - ...At the cost of introducing other page faults!
  - More complex code
- In any case, **huge overhead!!!**
  - Can we do better?
  - Not without paravirtualization or hardware support!

# Hardware Support for Page Table Virtualization

- In non-virtualized CPUs, the MMU translates VAs to PAs
  - Translation performed in hw  $\rightarrow$  fast, efficient
  - TLB-like caching tricks to improve performance
- What to do in virtualized CPUs?
  - Additional level of indirection:  $VA \rightarrow PA \rightarrow MA$  (Machine Address)
  - VA and PA are guest addresses, MA is a host address
- The MMU uses two page tables: guest page table ( $VA \rightarrow PA$ ) and host page table ( $PA \rightarrow MA$ )
  - Can use TLB-like caches and trickery, etc...

# Extended / Nested Page Tables

- Hardware feature provided by the major CPU manufacturers
  - Intel: Extended Page Tables (EPT)
  - AMD: Nested Page Tables (NPT)
  - ARM has a similar thing, too...
- Different naming, small differences, similar concepts
  - The VMM can setup a Nested / Extended page table to convert guest PAs in host MAs
  - The guest can handle its page table (no need to intercept accesses to the guest page table!)
  - The VMM just needs to update its extended page table when a guest tries to access a PA not mapped in MA